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Bassett: Reversal Due to Fundamental Error in the Jury Charge Requires a S

CRIMINAL LAW - Jury Charges - Reversal Due To
Fundamental Error In The Jury Charge Requires A
Showing Of "Egregious Harm" To The Accused If The
Error Is Not Objected To At Trial
Almanza v. State
686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)
Cipriano Ramon Almanza and a friend, Archie, forced their way into the
house of Mary and Michael Hayes on the night of December 28, 1979.1
Almanza held a pistol on Mr. Hayes, forcing him to watch while Archie
raped Mrs. Hayes. 2 The woman submitted out of fear for her life and the life
of her husband.' Although Almanza admitted on direct examination that he
and Archie had been at the Hayes's home and that Archie had raped the
woman, Almanza denied being a party to the rape.4 The indictment charging Almanza with aggravated rape connected the aggravating factors with
"and" while the jury charge connected the aggravating factors with "or. '
This change from the conjunctive to the disjunctive allowed the jury to convict on an alternate theory of aggravated rape not alleged in the indictment.6
Almanza was convicted in the 213th Judicial District Court, Tarrant

1. See Record Vol. III at 33, reprinted in McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez,
Fundamental Defect in Appellate Review of Errorin the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 827, 842 (1984). Since no decision has been rendered reciting the full facts of this case, the
facts are taken from the statement of facts and transcript of the trial. For a detailed discussion
of the facts in Almanza, see McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, FundamentalDefect
in Appellate Review of Errorin the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 827, 842-44 (1984).
Both the Hayeses and Almanza only knew Almanza's friend as Archie. See Almanza v. State,
No. 2-81-340-CR, slip op. at 2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, Sept. 25, 1985, no pet.) (not yet
reported). Archie was never apprehended. See id. at 2.
2. See Record Vol. III at 53, reprinted in McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez,
Fundamental Defect in Appellate Review of Errorin the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 827, 842 (1984).
3. See Record Vol. III at 58, 66, reprintedin McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, FundamentalDefect in Appellate Review ofErrorin the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 827, 842-43 (1984).
4. See Record Vol. IV at 49, 52, reprintedin McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez,
Fundamental Defect in Appellate Review of Errorin the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 827, 843 (1984).

5. See Almanza v. State, 645 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983) (allegations of threats of death joined by "and" in indictment but by "or" in jury charge), rev'd, 686
S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
6. See Id. at 886 (approach of changing "and" to "or" is fatal where matters of aggravation involved).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 17 [2022], No. 2, Art. 7

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:493

County, for aggravated rape.7 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed,
and the State filed for discretionary review.' Thereafter, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted, and then dismissed, the State's petition, holding that it
had been improvidently granted. 9 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, en
banc, granted the State's motion for rehearing to determine if fundamental
error existed in the jury charge.1 ° Held - Reversed and remanded.11 Reversal due to fundamental error in the jury charge requires a showing of
"egregious harm" to the accused if the error is not objected to at trial.12
Fundamental error is generally defined as error threatening the fairness of
a trial or the integrity and reputation of the system of justice. 13 Texas courts

7. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 157-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on
Motion for Reh'g). Almanza appealed the conviction. See id. at 158. The jury charge upon
which Almanza was convicted read as follows:
Now, if you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 28th
day of December, 1979, in Tarrant County, Texas, a person known as "Archie" did then
and there intentionally or knowingly without the consent of Mary Hayes, a female, have
sexual intercourse with the said Mary Hayes, and that the said Mary Hayes was not then
the wife of said "Archie" and that said "Archie" intentionally and knowingly compelled
submission to such sexual intercourse by a force that overcame such earnest resistance as
might reasonably be expected under the circumstances or that said "Archie" intentionally
or knowingly compelled submission to the sexual intercourse by a threat of death to be
imminently inflicted upon Michael Hayes, and that such threat was such that it would
prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution, under the same or similar circumstances because of a reasonable fear of harm, and if you further believe from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that on such occasion the Defendant, Cipriano Ramon Almanza, Jr., acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, if any,
solicited, encouraged, directed, aided or attempted to aid said "Archie" in the commission
of the offense, if any, then you will find the Defendant guilty of the offense of aggravated
rape as charged in Count Two of the indictment and so say be your verdict.
See Transcript at 39-40, reprintedin McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, Fundamental Defect in Appellate Review of Errorin the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 827, 84344 n.96 (1984).
8. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on Motion for Reh'g).
9. See id. at 159.
10. See id. at 159.
11. See id. at 174. The court reasoned that proper procedural practice compelled that the
case be remanded. See id. at 174. On remand, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals found that,
based on the "totality of the circumstances," Almanza had not suffered egregious harm. See
Almanza v. State, No. 2-81-340-CR, slip op. at 9 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, Sept. 25, 1985, no

pet.) (not yet reported).
12. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on
Motion for Reh'g). In Almanza the court held that when no objection is made to the jury
charge at trial, defendant must claim the error is fundamental. See id at 171. The court also
held that reversal will occur only when the error is "egregious" in the sense that it denies the
defendant a "fair and impartial trial." See id. at 171.
13. See United States v. Anderson, 654 F.2d 1264, 1268 (8th Cir. 1981) (fundamental
error arises when actions of trial court affect defendant's "substantial" rights resulting in "mis-
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classify an error as fundamental if it is "calculated to injure the rights of the
appellant to the extent he has not had a fair and impartial trial." 4 In most
jurisdictions, the existence of fundamental error does not mandate automatic
reversal." In fact, Texas stands as the only jurisdiction to require automatic
reversal if fundamental error occurs. 16 This automatic reversal approach in
Texas is based on the defendant's right to due process in criminal proceedings.1 7 Thus, the fundamental error/automatic reversal procedure has be-

carriage of justice"); United States v. Mosquiz, 445 F.2d 963, 966 (5th Cir. 1971) (error fundamental if denying recognition of error would degrade "fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings"); see also State v. Williamson, 389 So. 2d 1328, 1331 (La. 1980) (fundamental error is error of such "importance and significance" that it violates "fundamental
requirements of due process"); Saylor v. State, 503 P.2d 226, 228 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972)
(error fundamental in nature when it denies defendant "a fair and impartial trial"). Fundamental error can also arise in civil proceedings. See Texas Indus. Traffic League v. Railroad
Comm'n of Texas, 633 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1982) (fundamental error arises when record
shows on its face that court lacked jurisdiction or when public interest is adversely affected).
14. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 522 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (reversal on
appeal due to error only when defendant denied a "fair and impartial trial"); Smith v. State,
513 S.W.2d 823, 829 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (fundamental error that which is "calculated to
injure the rights of the appellant to the extent that he has not had a fair and impartial trial");
Fennell v. State, 424 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (reversal for alleged error injury
charge only where error "calculated to injure the rights of the defendant or unless it appears
that he has not had a fair and impartial trial").
15. See, e.g., People v. Watson, 299 P.2d 243, 254 (Cal. 1956) (reversal due to fundamental error occurs after court examines "entire charge" and is content that more "favorable"
result for defendant would have been reached but for fundamental error); People v. Jones, 440
N.Y.S.2d 248, 255 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (simply because alleged fundamental error may
impinge on federal Bill of Rights does not alone "render it immune from the need and requirement of proper preservation"); Lunde v. State, 270 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Wis. 1978) ("nature" of
alleged fundamental error must be thoroughly examined before court will consider it in depth);
see also Braswell, The Texas Approach to FundamentalErrorin the CriminalJury Charge, 48
TEx. B.J. 278, 283 (1985) (federal courts rejected "per se" approach to review of fundamental
error).
16. See, e.g., Ford v. State, 615 S.W.2d 727, 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (fundamental
error in jury charge "requires" reversal); Ward v. State, 615 S.W.2d 752, 752-53 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1981) (judgment of conviction reversed in "interest of justice" where error appeared in
jury charge); Williams v. State, 612 S.W.2d 934, 935 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (fundamental
error in indictment required automatic reversal "in the interest of justice"); see also Gellis,
Reasons for Case Reversal in Texas: An Analysis, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 299, 314 (1985). One
commentator has called for Texas appellate courts to abandon the "per se" reversal approach
to fundamental error. See id. at 314. The courts are also urged to adopt the standard of
review used by the United States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions: unless the defendant
is harmed by the alleged error, no reversal is required. See id. at 314.
17. See, eg., Doyle v. State, 631 S.W.2d 732, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (failure of
application paragraph "infringes upon accused's federal and state constitutional rights to due
process of law"; defendant failed to receive fair jury trial); Exparte Clark, 597 S.W.2d 760, 761
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (total failure of charge in application paragraph denies appellant state
and federal constitutional guarantee to fair and impartial trial); Harris v. State, 522 S.W.2d
199, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (error presented to court calculated to injure appellants'
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come a key concept in Texas criminal procedure, due to the the large
number of reversals in the areas of jury charges and charging instruments."8
Fundamental error is that error that can be raised for the first time on
appeal, 9 whereas nonfundamental error must be objected to during trial or
rights because appellants failed to get fair trial which they are guaranteed under federal and
state constitutions). The court has held that where the jury charge required the jury to find
each essential element of the offense charged, comported with the legal theory in the indictment, and proved every factual allegation made in the indictment, the charge was not fundamentally defective since the accused was apprised of everything that due process and due
course of law require. See Sattiewhite v. State, 600 S.W.2d 277, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)
(Opinion on Motion for Reh'g); see also Braswell, The Texas Approach to FundamentalError
in the CriminalJury Charge, 48 TEx. B.J. 278, 280 (1985) (rationale behind automatic reversal
approach is "that it is enough that a constitutional right of the accused has been violated");
Braswell, FundamentalError in the Court's Charge to the Jury in Texas Criminal Cases; 46
TEx. B.J. 409, 410 (1983) (main reason for doctrine to insure criminally accused afforded
substantial justice and integrity of judicial system maintained).
18. See Thomas v. State, 605 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (Opinion on Motion for Reh'g) (fundamental error occurs when jury charge fails to charge jury on allegation
required to be proven in indictment); Thomas v. State, 599 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980) (error in jury charge fundamental if "calculated to injure the rights of the defendant" or
if it "denied a fair and impartial trial"); see also Exparte Williams, 634 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1982) (when culpable mental state requisite element of offense and indictment fails
to allege this element, indictment will not support conviction since it is fundamentally defective); American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (indictment which fails to charge an offense is fundamentally defective and subject to attack at
any time). Commentators have also noted the pervasive nature of fundamental error in Texas
criminal procedure. See Braswell, The Texas Approach to FundamentalErrorin the Criminal
Jury Charge, 48 TEx. B.J. 278, 278 (1985) (fundamental error reversals "continue to erupt
from Texas Court of Criminal Appeals"); Dix, The Need for Reform in Texas ChargingInstrument Law, 47 TEx. B.J. 490, 490 (1984) (points out peculiarities of charging instrument "body
of law" in Texas); McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, FundamentalDefect in Appellate Review of Errorin the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 827, 827 (1984) (authors
note "continued expansion" of automatic reversal standard of review for fundamental error).
19. See Thomas v. State, 605 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (when accused
fails to object at trial, this waives appellate review of all but fundamental error); Harris v.
State, 522 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (only where accused has been denied fair
and impartial trial will court consider reversal even though no objection to court's charge
raised at trial). Fundamental error in the court's charge to the jury can be raised for the first
time on appeal. See Rubio v. State, 607 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (where no
objection to jury charge raised at trial, only fundamental error will be considered on appeal);
Ellison v. State, 579 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (no objection made during trial
to jury charge; fundamental error allowed court to review appellant's claim); Jackson v. State,
578 S.W.2d 748, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (charge authorizing conviction for theory not
alleged in indictment is fundamentally erroneous and requires reversal even though accused
makes no trial objection to charge). Similarly, fundamental defect in charging instruments
does not have to be objected to during trial in order to be raised on appeal. See Jones v. State,
622 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ("interest of justice" mandates review of fundamental defect in charging instrument for first time on appeal); Keagan v. State, 618 S.W.2d 54,
57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (conviction based on fundamentally defective indictment can be
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it is waived on appeal.2" Fundamental error was recognized in Texas as
early as 1875.21 Following this recognition, the statutes concerning fundamental error have been modified on numerous occasions, and as a result, the
courts' treatment and definition of fundamental error have changed accordingly.22 Currently, Texas courts define fundamental error as error "calcu-

attacked for first time in Court of Criminal Appeals); Burrell v. State, 526 S.W.2d 799, 802

(Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (even if accused fails to object at trial to amendment of indictment,
objection can be raised for first time on appeal when indictment involves matter of substance).
20. See Nelson v. State, 607 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (defendant cannot
urge error for first time on appeal if error not timely objected to at trial); Cooper v. State, 578
S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (preservation of error requires timely objection and
grounds of objection must be stated); Dinn v. State, 570 S.W.2d 910, 915 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978) (since no objections made at trial to alleged errors, they provided no basis for review);
Kerns v. State, 550 S.W.2d 91, 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (failure of defendant to object at
trial; no error preserved for review). Nonfundamental error, in certain instances, may be
deemed by the courts to be harmless. See Cook v. State, 611 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Tex. Crim. App.
1981) (failure to provide transcript, in certain instances, can be harmless error); Maldonado v.

State, 507 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (error can be harmless where juror spoke
with defendant after being impaneled); Lacy v. State, 424 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. Crim. App.
1967) (admission of hearsay testimony was harmless to defendant).
21. See Bishop v. State, 43 Tex. 390, 396 (1875) (reversal could result if error was "calculated to injure the rights of the defendant," even if objection to jury charge first raised on
appeal). The court in Bishop interpreted article 602 of the Old Code of Criminal Procedure.

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 602 (Paschal 2d ed. 1870) (repealed in 1879). Article 602
provided:
Whenever it appears that by the record in any criminal action, taken to the Supreme
Court upon appeal by the defendant, that the instructions given to the jury were verbal
(except where so given by consent in a case of misdemeanor), or that the District Judge
has departed from any of the requirements of the eight preceding Articles, the judgment
shall be reversed, provided it appears by the record, that the defendant excepted to the
order or action of the Court at the time of the trial.
Id. Other articles set forth the procedures for creating and delivering the jury charge. Id. arts.
595-601. The Bishop court also noted their constitutional power to reverse error, even if not
objected to at trial. See Bishop v. State, 43 Tex. 390, 403 (1875) (not necessary to raise jury
charge objections at trial in order for supreme court to revise action relating to charge because
authority derived from constitutional and legislative sources giving revision and correction
power in criminal proceedings). For other discussions of Bishop, see Doyle v. State, 631
S.W.2d 732, 739-41 (rex. Crim. App. 1982) (Opinion on Motion for Reh'g) (Clinton, J., concurring) (in depth analysis of "calculated to injure" standard and court's reasoning); Braswell,
Fundamental Error in the Court's Charge to the Jury in Texas Criminal Cases, 46 TEx. B.J.
409, 410 (1983) (citing holding and reasoning behind "calculated to injure" standard); McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, FundamentalDefect in Appellate Review of Errorin the
Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY's L.J. 827, 830-31 (1984) (analysis of "calculated to injure"
standard).
22. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 685 (1879) (repealed 1895). Article 685, formerly
article 602 of the Old Code, provided:
Whenever it appears by the record in any criminal action, upon appeal of the defendant,
that any of the requirements of the eight preceding articles has been disregarded the judgment shall be reversed; provided, the error is excepted to at the time of trial.
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lated to injure the rights of the defendant" to the extent that the defendant

Id. (emphasis in original). Under article 685, courts held that reversal was mandated when a
proper trial objection to the jury charge was made. See Cunningham v. State, 27 Tex. Ct. App.
479, 482, 11 S.W. 485, 488 (1889) (when error of stating law occurs, regardless how material, if
properly objected to and presented on appeal by proper bill of exception, article 685 mandates
reversal without inquiry as to impact of error on jury); Martin v. State, 25 Tex. Ct. App. 557,
576, 8 S.W. 682, 682 (1888) (court refused to consider exceptions that defense counsel stated
after jury retired since no fundamental error pointed out); Mace v. State, 9 Tex. Ct. App. 110,
113 (1880) (if objection made at trial, duty of court to reverse judgment without inquiry into
what effect the charge had on trial); see also McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, Fundamental Defect in Appellate Review of Errorin the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J.
827, 831-32 nn.22-23 (1984) (noting revisions in article 602 and cases construing article 685).
In 1895, article 685 was modified, emerging as article 723. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art.
723 (1895) (repealed in 1897). Article 723 was later amended in 1897. See S.B. No. 36, ch. 21,
sec. 1, 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws 17, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1071 (1897). Article 723
provided:
Whenever it appears by the record in any criminal action, upon appeal by the defendant,
that any of the requirements of the eight preceding Articles have been disregarded, the

judgment shall not be reversed unless the error appearing from the record was calculated
to injure the rights of the defendant, which error shall be excepted to at the time of the
trial, or on a motion for a new trial.
Id.; compare TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 723 (1895) ("which error shall be excepted to at
the time of trial, or on a motion for a new trial")(emphasis added) with TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 685 (1879) ("provided, the error is excepted to at the time of trial"); see also Doyle
v. State, 631 S.W.2d 732, 742 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (Opinion on Motion for Reh'g)
(Clinton, J., concurring) (rewording of article 685 as seen in article 723 revised concept; under
article 723 no reversal unless raised by bill of exception or on motion for new trial and error
calculated to injure defendant's rights). The courts' interpretations of article 723 allowed for
the continuing practice of reviewing fundamental error even though it was not objected to at
trial. See Davis v. State, 28 Tex. Ct. App. 542, 560, 13 S.W. 994, 995 (1890) (if error material
in that it injured defendant's rights, judgment should be reversed, even if error raised in motion
for new trial); Leache v. State, 22 Tex. Ct. App. 279, 314, 3 S.W. 539, 546 (1886) (if jury
charge first excepted to at motion for new trial, no revision unless error, upon review, was
"calculated to prejudice the rights of the accused."). In 1913, the Texas Legislature enacted
article 743. See Act of April 5, 1913, ch. 138, § 4, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 278, 279. Article 743
provided:
Whenever it appears by the record in any criminal action upon appeal of the defendant
that any of the requirements of the nine preceding articles have been disregarded, the
judgment shall not be reversed unless the error appearing from the record was calculated
to injure the rights of the defendant, or unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial, and all objections to the charge, and on account
of refusal or modification of special charges shall be made at the time of the trial.
Id. The impetus for this legislative amendment apparently was the great number of reversals
in criminal cases due to errors not being brought to the judge's attention before the charge was
given. See id. at 279; see also McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, FundamentalDefect in Appellate Review of Errorin the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 827, 832-33
(1984) (analysis of 1913 Act, legislature's reasoning, and interpretative cases). In cases construing article 743, the courts enunciated two standards of review for fundamental error.
Compare McCauley v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 1, 4, 259 S.W. 938, 939 (1924) (Opinion on Motion
for Reh'g) (no review since no fundamental error) and Childs v. State, 81 Tex. Crim. 21, 23-4,
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has been denied a "fair and impartial trial."2 3 In Cumbie v. State,24 the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized only four categories of fundamental error in jury charges:2 5 (1) the omission from the charge of an allegation from the indictment which is required to be proven;2 6 (2) the
193 S.W. 664, 665 (1917) (Opinion on Motion for Reh'g) (under article 743, unless fundamental error is present, court can only review exceptions taken to charge before argument began)
with Echols v. State, 75 Tex. Crim. 369, 381, 170 S.W. 786, 792 (1914) (only objections to jury
charge which can be raised for first time on appeal are those that "prevent the appellant from
having a fair and impartial trial") and Clay v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 78, 79, 164 S.W. 1, 1 (1914)
(only error that "prevent[s] appellant from having a fair and impartial trial" can be objected to
after trial). With little modification, article 743 became article 36.19 in 1966. See TEX. CODE
ChIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.19 (Vernon 1981). Article 36.19 provides:
Whenever it appears by the record in any criminal action upon appeal that any requirement of Articles 36.14, 36.15, 36.16, 36.17, and 36.18 has been disregarded, the judgment
shall not be reversed unless the error appearing from the record was calculated to injure
the rights of the defendant, or unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not
had a fair and impartial trial. All objections to the charge and to the refusal of special
charges shall be made at the time of trial.
Id. Under article 36.19, the current statute defining the standard of review for fundamental
error in jury charges, the courts have reversed numerous cases. See, e.g., Windham v. State,
530 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (fundamental error requiring reversal where jury
charge authorized conviction on simple assault while defendant charged with aggravated assault); Harris v. State, 522 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (if objection not made in
accordance with article 36.14, reversal on appeal only if the accused denied fair and impartial
trial); Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823, 828-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (if no proper objection
made to jury charge at trial, only fundamental error requires reversal under 36.19).
23. See Ross v. State, 487 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
24. 578 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
25. See id. at 733-34 (court establishes four grounds for automatic reversal due to fundamental error in jury charge). See generally Braswell, FundamentalErrorin the Court'sCharge
to the Jury in Texas Criminal Cases; 46 TEx. B.J. 409, 410-15 (1983) (Braswell discusses not
only four Cumbie categories but also eleven other grounds of fundamental error enunciated by
Texas courts); McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, Fundamental Defect in Appellate
Review of Errorin the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 827, 836 (1984) (referring to
Cumbie as "the mainstay of recent Texas case law regarding fundamental error in the court's
charge"); Odom & Valdez, A Review of FundamentalErrorin Jury Chargesin Texas Criminal
Cases, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 749, 750-60 (1981) (in-depth analysis of Cumbie categories).
26. See Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Once the indictment alleges an element of the crime, the allegation must be included in the jury charge and
the failure to do so is fundamental error. See Windham v. State, 530 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1975) (jury not required to find knife was "deadly weapon" in charge authorizing
conviction for aggravated assault); Garza v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 655, 658, 288 S.W.2d 785,
787 (1956) (defendant charged with possession of beer; jury authorized to convict for possession of empty bottles); Moore v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 256, 257, 206 S.W. 683, 684 (1918)
(court's charge must conform to charges in indictment; fundamental error if conviction authorized on any state of facts besides those alleged in indictment). When such an omission
occurs, the state's burden of proof is reduced. See Odom & Valdez, A Review of Fundamental
Errorin Jury Chargesin Texas CriminalCases 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 749, 751-54 (1981). Every
essential element of the offense charged in the indictment must be proven. See id. at 751. The
most common omission is the failure in the jury charge to require the jury to find the defend-
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substitution in the jury charge of a theory of the offense completely different
from the theory alleged in the indictment;2 7 (3) authorization by the charge
to convict on the theory alleged in the indictment and on one or more other
theories not alleged;2" and (4) authorization by the charge to convict for
conduct which is not an offense.2 9 Classifying error as fundamental under
ant acted with the culpable mental state. See id. at 751. Even though omission of an entire
element of an offense is fundamental error, the jury charge is not required to exactly conform
to every single factual allegation made in the indictment. See id. at 752; cf. West v. State, 567
S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (when jury charge allows conviction without requiring jury to find all elements of offense alleged in indictment, fundamental error present).
27. See Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). A jury charge
authorizing conviction on a theory not alleged in the indictment is fundamental error. See
Gooden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (in application paragraph, jury
charge authorized conviction on theory not alleged in indictment, thus fundamental error resulted); Peoples v. State, 548 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (fundamental error
present when jury charge authorized conviction on "forgery by making" but defendant indicted on "forgery by passing"; in essence, jury could convict defendant on theory totally
different than alleged in indictment); Long v. State, 548 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977) (when jury charge authorizes conviction upon theory not alleged in indictment, fundamental error results); accord Ross v. State, 487 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). The
court held the jury charge fundamentally defective since it erroneously authorized defendant's
conviction on a theory not alleged in the indictment. See id. at 745. "Even though there was
no objection to the charge at trial, the error was fundamental and calculated to injure the
rights of the appellant to the extent that he has not had a fair and impartial trial." Id. at 745.
If the jury charge contains elements of conduct other than those alleged in the indictment, this
allows the jury to convict the defendant on charges to which he has no notice, thus fundamental error exists. See generally Odom & Valdez, A Review of Fundamental Error in Jury
Charges in Texas Criminal Cases 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 749, 754-55 (1981) (discussing nature
and effect of substitution in jury charges).
28. See Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Allowing a jury to
convict on theories not alleged in the indictment constitutes fundamental error. See Brewer v.
State, 572 S.W.2d 940, 941 (rex. Crim. App. 1978) (jury charge authorized conviction for
aggravated robbery under theories not alleged in indictment which requires reversal); Edmond
v. State, 566 S.W.2d 609, 612 (rex. Crim. App. 1978) (jury charge authorized conviction on
theory not alleged in indictment, fundamental error occurred); Robinson v. State, 553 S.W.2d
371, 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (jury charge authorized conviction for aggravated robbery on
variety of theories under Penal Code sections, instead of charging only theory in indictment);
see also Dowden v. State, 537 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (fundamental that conviction for offense cannot stand unless charge authorized jury to find defendant guilty only for
conduct constituting offense). This type of jury charge error "enlarges" the indictment, allowing conviction on proof less than or different than that required to be proven in the indictment. See generallyOdom & Valdez, A Review ofFundamentalErrorin Jury Chargesin Texas
Criminal Cases, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 749, 755-58 (1981) (discussing "enlargement" type error
and types of charges commonly exhibiting such error).
29. See Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732, 734-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); see also Smith
v. State, 603 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (defendant indicted on offense of injury
to child; jury charge authorized conviction if defendant guilty of failure to act; fundamental
error since failure to act not offense); Sattiewhite v. State, 600 S.W.2d 277, 283 (rex. Crim.
App. 1980) (Opinion on Motion for Reh'g). In Sattiewhite, the court found clear fundamental
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Cumbie is important because the appellate courts presume harm to the defendant.3 ° Under the Cumbie categories, fundamental error, and its concomitant presumed harm, results in automatic reversal even when raised for
the first time on appeal.31
The frequent application of the fundamental error/automatic reversal procedure3 2 has prompted severe criticism from both the judiciary and commentators.3 3 This criticism has often focused on the court's "per se" or

error where the proof in the jury charge fell short of the offense alleged in the indictment, thus
denying the defendant notice of the crime with which he was charged with. See id. at 283.
"Adequate notice to the accused is the touchstone of a valid conviction - notice that is first
imparted by the accusatory instrument, then conformably effectuated by the evidence and, in a
sense, reflected by a charge to the jury." Id. at 282; see also Jackson v. State, 576 S.W.2d 88,
90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (Opinion on Motion for Reh'g) (defendant charged with aggravated
robbery and jury charge authorized conviction for "recklessly" threatening or placing in fear;
not an offense under Penal Code; error in charge fundamental). See generally Odom & Valdez,
A Review ofFundamental Errorin Jury Chargesin Texas CriminalCases 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
749, 759-60 (1981) (error of this type differs from other three because it not only enlarges on
indictment but allows conviction for non-criminal conduct).
30. See Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732, 733-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (court delineated four types of fundamental error requiring automatic reversal); Braswell, The Texas Approachto FundamentalErrorin the CriminalJury Charge,48 TEx. B.J. 278, 280 (1985) (under
Cumbie, court makes no attempt to determine if alleged error affected outcome of case; harm
presumed); McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, FundamentalDefect in Appellate Review of Errorin the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 827, 836 (1984) (in Cumbie, error
in any one of four categories requires automatic reversal because of presumed harm).
31. See Scott v. State, 599 S.W.2d 618, 618-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (even though
defendant failed to object at trial to alleged error, fundamental error found and case automatically reversed); Williams v. State, 547 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (defendant failed
to object at trial; fundamental error discovered, therefore, automatic reversal); see also Braswell, The Texas Approach to Fundamental Error in the CriminalJury Charge, 48 TEx. B.J.
278, 278 (1985) (fundamental error triggers reversal on appeal whether or not waived at trial);
McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, FundamentalDefect in Appellate Review of Error
in the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 827, 836 (1984) (automatic reversal required
under Cumbie, makes no difference whether or not error objected to during trial).
32. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 625 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (Clinton, J.,
concurring) (doctrine of fundamental error "firmly founded" and "well established" in Texas
criminal appellate review); Brown v. State, 595 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (fundamental error in court's charge to jury requires reversal even in absence of objection); Smith
v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823, 829 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (in absence of contemporaneous objection, only fundamental error requires reversal).
33. See Wilson v. State, 625 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (McCormick, J.,
dissenting) ("Until this court realizes that perpetuation of this magical doctrine has lost all
logical nexus with the protection of the rights of the defendant, but rather subjects our system
of justice to abuse and disrespect by the public, the doctrine will continue to flourish."). The
court's stance on fundamental error has been subject to criticism by both the judiciary and
commentators. See Antunez v. State, 647 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Onion, J.,
dissenting) (difficult for judges or lawyers to know where court is going regarding fundamental
error; "our weekly maps are utterly useless"); Wilson v. State, 625 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981) (McCormick, J., dissenting) ("fundamentally defective" has become "man-
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automatic reversal standard and its elimination of the need for contemporaneous objection to preserve a perceived error for appellate review.34 Several
authors have suggested that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reevaluate
the presumed harm/automatic reversal rule for fundamental error in jury
charges and create a more rigid standard for reversal, requiring the defend35
ant to demonstrate actual harm from the alleged fundamental error.

tra for this court, its chant" blinds court from even considering merits of case or applicable
law); Brewer v. State, 572 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (court has blindly followed
definition in Ross of fundamental error; definition is misstatement of law). Commentators
have also voiced opposition to the past standard of review for fundamental error. See Braswell, FundamentalErrorin the Court's Charge to the Jury in Texas Criminal Cases, 46 TEx.
B.J. 409, 416 (1983) (as result of extensive reversals and controversies surrounding court's
view of fundamental error, one must seriously examine view held by court of appeals and
methods used by trial courts in instructing juries); McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, FundamentalDefect in Appellate Review ofErrorin the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 827, 827 (1984) (no doctrine of criminal procedure has spawned as much discussion as
review of fundamental error in jury charge); Odom & Valdez, A Review of FundamentalError
in Jury Charges in Texas Criminal Cases, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 749, 749 (1981) (fundamental
error seen repeatedly infecting jury charges and requiring automatic reversal).
34. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 641 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (McCormick, J., dissenting) (appellant should object if he perceives error to be potentially harmful);
Mims v. State, 612 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (McCormick, J., dissenting) (fundamental error doctrine lead to court's ignoring article 36.14 requirements relating to jury
charge objections); Cleland v. State, 575 S.W.2d 296, 299-300 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (defense counsel not required since expansion of fundamental error doctrine
means failure to object does not waive error in jury charge); see also McCormick, Convery &
Icenhauer-Ramirez, Fundamental Defect in Appellate Review of Error in the Texas Jury
Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 827, 838 (1984) (perse reversal under Cumbie unsound and results
in appellate courts engaging in "rote, technical operation" leading to automatic reversal). Reviewing those cases reversed for fundamental error, it is evident that most of the time, the
defendant did not even urge the error on appeal. See id. at 848; see Odom & Valdez, A Review
of FundamentalErrorin Jury Charges in Texas CriminalCases, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.749, 749
(1981) (court committed to stance that fundamental error in jury charge results in automatic
reversal). Per se reversal has also led to criticism that this practice subverts proper trial procedure. See Braswell, Fundamental Error in the Court's Charge to the Jury in Texas Criminal
Cases, 46 TEX. B.J. 409, 409 (1983) (main problem with court's treatment of fundamental
error is that encourages defense counsel to "lay behind the log" during trial and not aid judge
in correcting possible errors in jury charge, hoping to gain automatic reversal on appeal);
McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, FundamentalDefect in Appellate Review of Error
in the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 827, 848 (1984) (fundamental error doctrine in
jury charges has eliminated need for contemporaneous objection rule during trial).
35. See Braswell, The Texas Approach to Fundamental Error in the Criminal Jury
Charge, 48 TEx. B.J. 278, 283 (1985) (article 36.19 clearly mandates review of entire trial
record to determine if defendant harmed by alleged fundamental error and thus reversal required); McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, Fundamental Defect in Appellate Review
of Errorin the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 827, 849 (1984) (argument has been for
return to requirement that reversal occurs only in cases where appellant sustained some prejudicial harm). Under the pre-Almanza standard, it is noted that an appellant can obtain a
reversal for a fundamental error, even if it is beneficial to him. See id. at 838. It has been
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In Almanza v. State,36 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals created a new
standard of review for fundamental error in jury charges. 37 Justice Clinton,
writing for the majority, began with an extensive review of the Texas statutes
and cases involving fundamental error in jury charges in criminal cases. 38
Justice Clinton concluded that article 36.19 contains standards of review for
both nonfundamental error and fundamental error. 39 There must be a
timely trial objection to nonfundamental error in order to preserve the error
If nonfundamental error is properly preas a viable basis for reversal.'
served, reversal occurs only if the error is "calculated to injure the rights of
the defendant,"4 24 1 and the accused proves that the alleged error resulted in
"some" harm. If the error is not objected to at trial, and therefore potentially waived, the majority requires the defendant to satisfy two criteria to
obtain a reversal. 43 First, the accused must demonstrate that the error was

suggested that review of fundamental error be on a case-by-case basis, with an examination of
the entire trial court record, reversal occurring only in those rare cases where "error is so
egregious that it directly affects the outcome of case." See id. at 849; see also Braswell, Fundamental Error in the Court's Charge to the Jury in Texas Criminal Cases, 46 TEx. B.J. 409, 409
(1983) (large number of cases being reversed due to fundamental error justifies deep concern of
everyone interested in proper criminal justice administration).
36. 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on Motion for Reh'g).
37. See id. at 171. The majority overruled Cumbie and all other cases to the extent that
they espoused the old "automatic reversal" standard. See id at 174; see also McCormick,
Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, Fundamental Defect in Appellate Review of Error in the Texas
Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 827, 850 (1984) (noting that after Almanza was first decided
on state's petition for discretionary review, court did not seem as "firmly committed" to past
method of review as others had indicated).
38. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 160-71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on
Motion for Reh'g). Judge Clinton traced the evolution of fundamental error in jury charges
from the old Code article 602 through article 36.19. See id. at 160-71.
39. See id. at 171. The majority based this conclusion on their research of statutorial and
decisional law concerning fundamental error. See id. at 171. The phrase "or unless it appears
from the record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial" was viewed as the
legislature's recognition of a separate and distinct standard of review for fundamental error.
See id. at 172. The majority stated that their examination and conclusion concerning article
36.19 and its predecessors was "more defensible than any other reading of the statute .... See
id at 172; see also TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.19 (Vernon 1981) ("[t]he judgment
shall not be reversed unless the error appearing from the record was calculated to injure the
rights of the defendant, or unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not had a
fair and impartial trial").
40. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on
Motion for Reh'g).
41. See id. at 171. "If the error in the charge was the subject of a timely objection in the
trial court, then reversal is required if the error is calculated to injure the rights of the defendant ....

"

Id. at 171.

42. See id. at 171. The majority stated that any error which had been properly preserved
would result in reversal "as long as the error is not harmless." See id. at 171.
43. See id.at 171. The accused would have to show the error as fundamental, and also
that he has suffered egregious harm. See id at 171.
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fundamental;" in that it was "calculated to injure the rights of the appellant
to the extent that the appellant has not had a fair and impartial trial."45
Secondly, the accused must show that the fundamental error resulted in
"egregious harm," leading to the denial of a "fair and impartial trial."" The
majority stated that the egregious harm requirement will be satisfied only
after the court examines the entire trial record, including the jury charge as a
whole.4 7 After summarily overruling the automatic reversal rule of Cumbie,
the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case to the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals, instructing the appellate court to review the conviction in light
of the newly established egregious harm standard of review.4
In a lengthy concurrence and dissent, Justice Onion began by attacking
the majority's conclusion that article 36.19 contains standards of review for
both nonfundamental error and fundamental error.4 9 Justice Onion concluded that article 36.19 contained only a standard of review for nonfundamental error.50 Justice Onion also stated that it is the duty of the courts, and

44. See id. at 171. The majority noted that past decisions had been far from consistent in
enunciating the standard for fundamental error. See id. at 171-72. This inconsistency was
rationalized by the majority's conclusion that the inherent confusion in this area naturally
would result in some cases which would simply be wrong. See id. at 172.
45. See id. at 172. Even though the majority had arrived at a workable definition of
fundamental error, they noted that this only satisfied one prong of the new test. See id. at 172.
46. See id. at 171; see also McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, Fundamental
Defect in Appellate Review of Error in the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 827, 849
(1984) (authors define fundamental error as "error so egregious that it directly affects the
outcome of the case").
47. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 173-74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on
Motion for Reh'g) (majority quotes extensively from Davis v. State, 28 Tex. Ct. App. 542, 14
S.W. 994 (1890)). The review of the entire jury trial record would be to ascertain any facts
which "may illuminate the actual, not just theoretical, harm to the accused." See id. at 174.
48. See id. at 174. The majority stated that since the Fort Worth Court of Appeals had
based their decision solely on Messenger v. State, 638 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), they
could not have examined the entire record to see if the error complained of was "so egregiously
harmful as to require reversal." See id. at 174. The majority reasoned that "orderly review
procedure and a measure of deference to factual determinations by the Court of Appeals"
mandated remanding the case. See id. at 174.
49. See id. at 174 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Onion
stated that the majority had arrived at this conclusion by merely "removing commas in earlier
opinions and reinterpreting them," and by selecting excerpts from other cases. See id. at 174
(Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He went on to question the majority's
conclusion that the legislature evidently had adopted a fundamental error doctrine and thrust
it upon the judiciary, without defining it, choosing instead to "[bury] the phrase in question"
into the middle of article 36.19. See id. at 175 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
50. See id. at 175 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Both "calculated to injure" and "fair and impartial trial" tests are to be applied to nonfundamental error.

See id at 175-76 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "I find no support
for any claim that the legislature has ever adopted a fundamental error doctrine or a test that
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not the legislature, to determine whether fundamental error exists in the jury
charge."1 He concluded that fundamental error is that error "affecting the
very foundation of the conviction's validity" and results in reversal "only in
the most compelling cases." 52 Justice Onion did however agree with the
majority's holding that the court should examine the entire trial record
before finding fundamental error.5 3 Noting the majority's overruling of the
automatic reversal requirement of Cumbie, Justice Onion expressed frustration at the possibility of a conviction being upheld even though fundamental
error existed in the court's charge to the jury.54 He termed this new creation
- "harmless fundamental error" - a contradiction he could not accept."
Finally, Justice Onion strongly disagreed with the majority's actions in remanding the case without any guidance for determining whether Almanza
suffered egregious harm.5 6
In a strong dissent, Justice Teague voiced concern that the new egregious
harm requirement will reduce the quality of jury charges since reversal now
occurs in only the most egregious cases. 57 Justice Teague noted that the
courts were not given any guidance in how to determine if egregious harm
exists in a jury charge. 5' He also criticized the majority's promulgation of

must be applied by the judiciary, the third branch of the government, to a claim of fundamental error in the court's charge .. " Id. at 176 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
51. See id. at 176 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Fundamental
error is a matter for the courts to decide and the legislature has no constitutional authority in
the matter. See id. at 176 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. See id. at 177 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Onion
stated that fundamental harm is error that has "resulted in actual harm, remarkable or extraordinary in some bad way, of a glaring or flagrant nature." See id. at 177 (Onion, P.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. See id. at 177 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Justice Onion
"fully" agreed with majority that entire jury charge, evidence, argument of counsel and entire
record should be examined to determine if fundamental error exists).
54. See id. at 178 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "With the
limited surgery performed on Cumbie and its progeny, will we be left with four kinds of fundamental error that may be in the light of the record 'harmless fundamental error'?" Id. at 178
(Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. See id. at 178 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "I would have
hoped the majority would go far enough to spare us the doctrine of 'harmless fundamental
error.'" Id at 178 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. See id. at 178 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Noting the
absolute lack of "judicial economy" in the court's action, Judge Onion asked, "[i]s the purpose
to run the new rule up the flag pole to see how many salutes it receives before proceeding to
utilize it ourselves?" See id. at 178 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. See id at 179 (Teague, J., dissenting). "After today, harmless error should prevent
even the most egregiously worded jury charge from constituting reversible error." Id at 179
(Teague, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 179 (Teague, J., dissenting). "Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim.
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"nebulous rules" which jeopardize the defendant's right to a fair trial.59 Justice Teague concluded by urging that trial judges, despite the majority's ruling, continue to6 place great emphasis on the quality of the jury charge in
criminal cases.

0

Prior to Almanza, error in criminal proceedings could be classified by
three categories: (1) nonfundamental harmful error;6 1 (2) nonfundamental
harmless error; 62 and (3) fundamental presumed harmful error.63 Almanza,
however, specifically creates a new type of error in Texas criminal proce-

App. 1979), and like decisions of this court, are no more as they have been expressly overruled
by today's majority opinion." Id. at 179 (Teague, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 179 (Teague, J., dissenting). Justice Teague points out that Justice Clinton
failed to give the slightest hint of what may constitute reversible error but then reasons that
Justice Clinton could not formulate a reasonable hypothetical. See id. at 179 (Teague, J.,
dissenting).
60. See id. at 179-80 (Teague, J., dissenting). "To the majority's efforts to have our juries
served with flawed jewels, and a tasteless smorgasbord, I respectfully dissent." Id. at 180
(Teague, J., dissenting). Justice Teague's view of jury charges has been echoed in other cases.
E.g., Williams v. State, 547 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). "It is not the function of
the charge to merely avoid misleading or confusing the jury: it is the function of the charge to
lead and prevent confusion." Id. at 20.
61. See, e.g., Timmons v. State, 586 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (harmful
nonfundamental error required reversal where defendant demonstrated he had been denied
statement of facts without any fault of his own); Lumberas v. State, 560 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1977) (harmful nonfundamental error required reversal where defendant convicted
for sale of phentermine and penalty no longer existed for such offense); Hooper v. State, 557
S.W.2d 122, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (nonfundamental harmful error required reversal
where defendant not represented by counsel at trial and there was no voluntary and intelligent
waiver of counsel).
62. See, e.g., Ayers v. State, 606 S.W.2d 936, 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (harmless
nonfundamental error where prosecutor improperly bolstered state's witness); Lejeune v. State,
538 S.W.2d 775, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (harmless nonfundamental error where envelope
containing marijuana admitted into evidence and defendant made no objection to admission);
Fazzino v. State, 531 S.W.2d 818, 819-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (harmless nonfundamental
error where witness' statement admitted that witness heard gossip that defendant pushed dope
and ran whore house due to admission of other testimony showing defendant committed many
other offenses).
63. See, e.g., Dulkes v. State, 610 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (fundmental
error where defendants charged with robbery by "threats" with aggravating element of "using
and exhibiting a deadly weapon" and jury charge allowed conviction for robbery by "causing
bodily injury" with aggravating factor of "causing serious bodily injury"); Lee v. State, 577
S.W.2d 736, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (fundamental error where indictment charged aggravated robbery by using and exhibiting handgun and "placing" witness in fear of imminent
bodily injury and death and jury charge allowed conviction if defendant either "threatened" or
placed witness in fear of imminent bodily injury and death); Armstead v. State, 573 S.W.2d
231, 231-32 (rex. Crim. App. 1978) (fundamental error where indictment charged robbery on
theory that defendant intentionally or knowingly threatened or placed victim in fear of imminent bodily injury and death and charge allowed conviction if jury found defendant intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly caused bodily injury to victim).
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dure: fundamental error resulting in egregious harm." This new standard
affects fundamental error in the same way that harm affects nonfundamental
error. 65 A reversal results in either case only when the attendant harm standard is satisfied.66 Unlike the easily satisfied "some harm" standard of
nonfundamental error, the egregious harm requirement appears to be impossible to satisfy. 67 Absent a clear definition of what constitutes egregious
harm, 68 the courts consistently fail to reverse for fundamental error. 69 Had

64. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (rex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on
Motion for Reh'g) (failure to properly object to perceived error in jury charge requires defendant to demonstrate that alleged error not only fundamental but caused him egregious harm).
Almanza also allows for the existence of "harmless fundamental error." See id at 178 (Onion,
P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questions majority's creation of harmless fundamental error under Cumbie). By inference, the majority has also allowed for the situation
whereby fundamental error is objected to at trial and results in reversal on appeal simply by
showing "some" harm to the defendant. Cf Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (rex.
Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on Motion for Reh'g) (any error in charge subject to objection at
trial results in reversal on appeal if "some" harm to accused shown) (emphasis added) see also
Burns v. State, No. 68,942 (Tex. Crim. App., Dec. 4, 1985) (not yet reported) (objection at
trial to fundamental error; on appeal "some" harm standard applied).
65. Compare Melancon v. State, 690 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1985, no pet.) (although fundamental error existed in jury charge, no automatic reversal required since defendant not egregiously harmed) and Bonfanti v. State, 686 S.W.2d 149, 152-53
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (fundamental error in jury charge did not require automatic reversal
since no egregious harm shown) with Jordan v. State, 576 S.W.2d 825, 830 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978) (nonfundamental error to admit illegally obtained evidence but reversal not required
since error harmless) and Myre v. State, 545 S.W.2d 820, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)
(nonfundamental error to admit hearsay testimony into evidence but since error harmless, no
reversal required).
66. Compare Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on
Motion for Reh'g) (reversal due to non-objected to fundamental error occurs only if egregious
harm shown) with Hooper v. State, 557 S.W.2d 122, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (reversal due
to nonfundamental error required when defendant harmed by lack of representation at trial).
67. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 688 S.W.2d 560, 561 (rex. Crim. App. 1985) (Teague, J.,
dissenting) (Almanza is test that no one will ever pass; "no pass - penitentiary" rule); Kucha
v. State, 686 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Teague, J., concurring) (new harmless
fundamental error standard will prevent even most egregiously worded jury charges from constituting reversible fundamental error); Bonfanti v. State, 686 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985) (Teague, J., concurring) (under Almanza, egregiously harmful, fundamental error
will never occur).
68. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 179 (rex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on
Motion for Reh'g) (Teague, J., dissenting) (Teague notes majority has provided "nebulous
rules" to aid judges and attorneys in determining what constitutes egregiously harmful fundamental error).
69. See, e.g., Khan v. State, 689 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no pet.)
(any error which existed not so egregious to deny defendant fair and impartial trial); Ishmael
v. State, 688 S.W.2d 252, 261 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no pet.) (court summarily finds
no egregious harm in charge and thus no reversible fundamental error); Fara v. State, 688
S.W.2d 235, 239 (rex. App.-El Paso 1985, no pet.) (no egregiously harmful, fundamental
error in jury charge containing typographical error).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 17 [2022], No. 2, Art. 7

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:493

the courts utilized the pre-Almanza automatic reversal standard, reversal
due to fundamental error would have been required in every recent decision.7 ° For example, under the old automatic reversal standard which presumed harm,7" any time the jury charge allowed conviction on a theory not
alleged in the indictment, fundamental error occurred and automatic reversal was required.72 But under the new egregious harm criterion, the courts
under the same facts have failed to reverse for fundamental error. 73 Therefore, a criminal defense attorney is faced with a newly minted classification
of fundamental error requiring the satisfaction of a standard of harm of such
magnitude that it has yet to be defined. 74 As a result, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, through Almanza, may have completely eliminated the
possibility of reversal for fundamental error in jury charges in Texas criminal cases.7 5
70. Compare Bonfanti v. State, 686 S.W.2d 149, 153 (rex. Crim. App. 1985) (no denial of
fair and impartial trial where jury authorized to convict on theory not alleged in indictment)
and Melancon v. State, 690 S.W.2d 78, 80-81 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no pet.)
(jury charge authorized conviction on theory not alleged in indictment; not egregiously harmful even though fundamental error existed) with Gooden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979) (jury charge authorized conviction on theory not alleged in indictment;
fundamental error resulted) and Ross v. State, 487 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)
(court found jury charge contained fundamental error since it authorized defendant's conviction on theory not alleged in indictment).
71. See Braswell, The Texas Approach to Fundamental Error in the Criminal Jury
Charge,48 TEx. B.J. 278, 280 (1985) (under the court's pre-Almanza approach to fundamental
error "[h]arm is presumed").
72. See Shaw v. State, 557 S.W.2d 305, 306-07 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (indictment alleged burglary by entry, attempting theft, and committing theft; charge substituted entering
with intent to commit theft); Peoples v. State, 548 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)
(indictment alleged forgery by passing; jury charge substituted forgery by making).
73. See Melancon v. State, 690 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no
pet.) (jury charge authorized conviction for "break or enter"; indictment charged "break and
enter"; not egregiously harmful even though fundamental error found); Ishmael v. State, 688
S.W.2d 252, 261 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no pet.) (indictment used "fire" for charge of
murder; court charged jury with "shooting"; no egregiously harmful, fundamental error
found).
74. Compare Mercado v. State, 695 S.W.2d 25, 25-27 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985,
no pet.) (not egregiously harmful for court to instruct jury that intent to kill can be inferred
from use of deadly weapon) with Evans v. State, 606 S.W.2d 880, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)
(under pre-Almanza standard of review, jury charge allowing conviction without requiring
jury to establish all elements of offense was fundamental error); compare Starlling v. State, 693
S.W.2d 47,48-49 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no pet.) (not egregiously harmful for court to
fail to instruct jury on proper potential range of punishment) with Stein v. State, 515 S.W.2d
104, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (under pre-Almanza standard of review, failure of court to
correctly charge jury on range of punishment was fundamental error).
75. See Johnson v. State, 688 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Teague, J., dissenting) (juries can now second-guess court on what law should be, and in effect, convict for
crimes not alleged in indictment); Exparte Maldonado, 688 S.W.2d 114, 117 (rex. Crim. App.
1985) (Teague, J.,dissenting) ("something sadly wrong" with criminal procedure system
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Since charging instruments directly affect the submission of the court's
charge to the jury,7 6 it is also important to consider Almanza in light of its
potential impact upon charging instrument law in Texas." Although automatic reversal for fundamental error in jury charges is an extinct procedure
after Almanza, automatic reversal for fundamental defects in indictments
remains a prevalent procedure in Texas.7 8 The interrelationship between
jury charges and charging instruments is illustrated in Cumbie,7 9 where
three of the four categories of fundamental error in jury charges arise due to
deviations between the charge and the indictment.8 0 In addition, prior to
Almanza, automatic reversal resulted whenever a fundamental error was
found in the jury charge"1 or when a fundamental defect existed in the

which allows defendant to be denied relief due to egregious error in trial jury charge); Almanza
v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Teague, J., dissenting) (majority's new
standard will prevent even most egregiously constructed jury charges from constituting reversible error); Kucha v. State, 686 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Teague, J., concurring) (Almanza's reasoning inherently wrong since egregious harm rule espouses principles of
unfairness when determining if alleged error in jury charge is fundamental error requiring
automatic reversal). But see Bums v. State, No. 68,942 (Tex. Crim. App., Dec. 4, 1985) (not
yet reported) (reversal duty to jury charge error but only because trial objection established
"some" harm standard was appropriate).
76. See R. 0. DAWSON & G. E. Dix, TEXAS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 273 (1984) ("Obviously the charging instrument affects the submission of the case to the jury."). Only those
theories of guilt charged in the indictment can be submitted to the jury. See id. at 273.
77. See Braswell, The Texas Approach to Fundamental Error in the Criminal Jury
Charge, 48 TEX. B.J. 278, 280 (1985) ("safe to say" that 90% of automatic reversals due to
fundamental error in jury charge result of variance in jury charge from charging instrument).
78. See, e.g., Ex parte Munoz, 657 S.W.2d 105, 105 (rex. Crim. App. 1983) (indictment
that is fundamentally defective subject to collateral attack at any time); Ex pane Cooper, 589
S.W.2d 130, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (indictment not commencing with "In the Name and
by the Authority of the State of Texas" fundamentally defective since these words are "indispensible" to valid indictment); American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, 603 (rex.
Crim. App. 1974) (indictment failing to charge offense fundamentally defective and subject to
attack at any time). The ease of raising an objection to fundamental defect in charging instruments makes this option very attractive to defendants. See R. 0. DAWSON & G. E. Dix,
TEXAS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 297 (1984). Fundamental defects can be raised after a conviction has been affirmed or the time for appeal has expired. See id. at 297. Even a voluntary and
intelligent waiver of a fundamental defect does not bar the defendant from later attacking the
sufficiency of the indictment. See id at 297. The opportunity to object to fundamental defect
is also available to the defendant even if he was previously unaware of the defect or merely
made no attempt to raise such an objection. See id. at 289.
79. See Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732, 733-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (court enumerinstances when fundamental error arises in court's charge to jury).
four
ates
80. See id at 733-34. Fundamental error arises in the jury charge if: (1) court's charge
omits allegation from indictment required to be proven; (2) charge substitutes theory of offense
completely different from theory alleged in the indictment; and (3) charge authorizes conviction on theory alleged in the indictment and on one or more theories not alleged. See id at
733-34.
81. See Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (under pre-Al-
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charging instrument.8 2 After Almanza however, automatic reversal survives
only with fundamental defects in charging instruments.8 3 Finally, criticism
similar to that levelled against the automatic reversal procedure for fundamental error in jury charges, has also been raised against the court's auto84
matic reversal procedure for fundamental defects in charging instruments.
Based on these similarities between jury charges and charging instruments, it
appears that Almanza's egregious harm standard could soon emerge as the
criterion for reviewing fundamental defects in charging instruments.8 5
manza standard of review, failure of court to instruct jury on what circumstnces they could
convict appellant constituted fundamental error and automatic reversal); Perez v. State, 537
S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (under pre-Almanza standard of review, failure of
jury charge to instruct jurors under what circumstances they could convict defendant mandated reversal since error went to "basis" of case).
82. See Hobbs v. State, 548 S.W.2d 884, 885-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (indictment
which fails to allege defendant committed an offense is fundamentally erroneous and any resulting conviction void); American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, 602 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974) (omission of conclusion, although not technically formal part of indictment,
renders indictment fundamentally defective).
83. Compare Bonfanti v. State, 686 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Teague, J.,
concurring) (under Almanza, there can never be error denying defendant fair and impartial
trial) with R. 0. DAWSON AND G. E. Dix, TEXAS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 258-59 (1984)
(authors note that although the complexities of charging instrument law in Texas are unique to
American criminal procedure, they are an important part of current Texas criminal practice).
84. CompareExparte Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (majority's automatic reversal stance regarding fundamental defects in indictments
gives accused "free ride" since even if proof shows him guilty, he receives new trial by raising
objection by collateral attack) with Mims v. State, 612 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)
(McCormick, J., concurring) (contemporaneous objection requirements of article 36.14 eliminated by adoption of automatic reversal procedure with fundamental error in jury changes).
85. Compare Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on
Motion for Reh'g) (if no proper objection made during trial to perceived error in jury charge,
on appeal, defendant must satisfy egregious harm standard to gain reversal) with Tex. S.B. 169,
68th Leg. (1985) (amendment to Texas Constitution as of November 5, 1985) (if defendant
fails to object to perceived errors in charging instrument before trial beings, he waives right to
raise any such objection on appeal). Almanza's egregious harm standard of review is now
being applied in other areas of Texas criminal procedure. See Navarro v. State, No. 01-830478-CR, slip op. at 2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 12, 1985, no pet.) (not yet reported). In Navarro, appellants had waived the appearance of witnesses by stipulation as allowed by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15. See id. at 1. Under article 1.5, the judge's
signature is required to approve the waiver but no such signature was obtained. See id. at 2.
The judge did orally agree to the waiver and made a corresponding notation on the docket
sheet. See id. at 2. The court, relying directly on Almanza, stated that since the appellants
failed to show how they were harmed by the alleged fundamental error, this ground of error
was overruled. See id. at 4. Almanza's egregious harm standard has also been applied where
the State's attorney failed to sign appellant's waiver to a jury trial as required by TEx. CODE
CluM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.13. See Hoobler v. State, No. 01-84-0434-CR, slip op. at 2 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 8, 1985, no pet.) (not yet reported). Appellant made no objection at trial to the absence of the prosecutor's signature. See id. at 2. Applying Almanza, the
court concluded that since the appellant had neither urged nor shown harm as a result of the
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The impact of Almanza's egregious harm standard of review will also be
felt in the area of trial strategy, especially contemporaneous objection to perceived error in the jury charge.16 Before Almanza, a criminal defense attorney could intentionally fail to object at trial to fundamental error in the jury
charge since reversal was automatic on appeal."7 After Almanza, if a criminal defense attorney purposely fails to object at trial to a fundamental error
in the jury charge, the case will be subject to the new egregious harm rule on
appeal.8 8 This standard, as noted previously, has not yet mandated reversal
of any conviction based on fundamental error in the jury charge; therefore,
not objecting to fundamental error is now a risky trial strategy.8 9 If the
attorney does choose to object to the jury charge during trial, his objection

prosecutor's failure to sign the waiver, this ground of error was overruled. See id. at 4. More
importantly the court stated that although Almanza dealt with fundamental error in jury
charges, "it's re-examination of fundamental error should be applicable to other instances of
failure to comply fully with statutory requirements." See id. at 4.
86. See, e.g., Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on
Motion for Reh'g) (if no proper trial objection made to jury charge, reversal occurs only where
egregiously harmful fundamental error found from examining entire jury charge, evidence,
arguments of counsel and any other relevant information); Walters v. State, 694 S.W.2d 610,
611 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, no pet.) (under Almanza, since defendant failed to raise objection to jury charge at trial, court found no egregiously harmful, fundamental error in light of
entire jury charge, state of evidence, and argument of counsel); Starlling v. State, 693 S.W.2d
47, 49 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no pet.) (under Almanza, since no objection made to
jury charge at trial, court looked to argument of counsel, state of evidence, and other relevant
information but found no egregiously harmful fundamental error).
87. See Braswell, FundamentalErrorin the Court's Charge to the Jury in Texas Criminal
Cases, 46 TEX. B.J. 409, 409 (1983) (pre-Almanza standard of review encourages counsel, in
hope of automatic reversal on appeal, to purposely not aid trial judge in detecting potential
errors in jury charge); McCormick, Convery & Icenhauer-Ramirez, Fundamental Defect in
Appellate Review of Errorin the Texas Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 827, 848 (1984) (preAlmanza approach to review of fundamental error in jury charge eliminates need for contemporaneous trial objection).
88. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on
Motion for Reh'g) (if no proper objection made to jury charge during trial, reversal occurs
only where egregiously harmful, fundamental error found). But does Almanza also encourage
a trial strategy whereby a criminal defense attorney will bury an objection to fundamental
error in the jury charge among various other objections, hoping the judge will not correct the
error, thus allowing reversal of the objected to fundamental error by satisfying the "some"
harm standard? Cf Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion
on Motion for Reh'g) (any error in charge subject to objection at trial results in reversal on
appeal if "some" harm to accused shown) (emphasis added); cf also Burns v. State, No. 68,942
(Tex. Crim. App., Dec. 4, 1985) (not yet reported) (jury charge error objected to at trial, not
corrected by court; on appeal fundamental error measured by "some" harm standard and
reversal granted).
89. See Ishmael v. State, 688 S.W.2d 252, 261 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no pet.)
(court summarily finds no egregiously harmful fundamental error in jury charge); see also
Kucha v. State, 686 S.W.2d 154, 156 (rex. Crim. App. 1985) (alleged error injury charge not
egregiously harmful, fundamental error in light of entire trial record); Bonfanti v. State, 686
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will allow the court the opportunity to correct the alleged error, thus eliminating any hope of obtaining a reversal based on the initial error. 9° Taken
one step further, if Almanza's standard of review is extended into charging
instrument law, defense attorneys will be compelled to raise objections prior
to appeal to both jury charges and charging instruments, thereby giving the
state and the court the ability to eradicate any initial error which could serve
as a basis for reversal on appeal. 9 1
Fundamental error in jury charges, and its attendant automatic reversal
standard, had existed in Texas since as early as 1875. This settled routine
came to an abrupt halt with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' holding in
Almanza v. State. Almanza has not only specifically created a new category
of error in Texas criminal procedure, but its egregious harm standard of
review has neither been defined by the courts nor satisifed by any alleged
error in cases presented for review. Almanza's immediate impact on review
of fundamental error in jury charges is evident, but the potential for wider
application of its egregious harm standard of review is what makes the decision especially important. Almanza distorts the court-imposed symbiotic relationship between jury charges and charging instruments. Fundamental
error in jury charges is now subject to the exacting egregious harm standard
of review, while fundamental defects in charging instruments remain subject
to the traditional automatic reversal/presumed harm procedure. Based
upon the undeniable link between jury charges and charging instruments in
Texas, Almanza's egregious harm standard of review will undoubtedly
emerge in review procedures for fundamental defects in charging instruments. Until the tension between the two standards of review is resolved,
the imbalance will continue to plague the judiciary and, especially, the criminal defense attorney who is required to provide zealous adversarial representation for his client.
Michael H. Bassett
S.W.2d 149, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (no egregiously harmful fundamental error to defendant who received fair and impartial trial in light of evidence, argument and verdict).

90. See, e.g., Marks v. State, 617 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (timely jury
instruction to disregard alleged error in jury charge generally sufficient to cure error); Eanes v.
State, 546 S.W.2d 312, 314 (rex. Crim. App. 1977) (where jury charge erroneously included
"recklessly" in definition of assault and error specifically called to court's attention, subsequent

instruction informing jury to find "intentionally" or "knowingly" prevented reversible error);
Rivas v. State, 496 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (omission of "voluntary" from
jury charge for offense of murder did not constitute reversible error since subsequent instruction informed jury they were required to find intent to kill).
91. Compare Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Opinion on
Motion for Reh'g) (unobjected to error will be grounds for reversal only if it is egregiously
harmful fundamental error) with Tex. S.B. 169, 68th Leg. (1985) (amendment to Texas Constitution as of November 5, 1985) (ifdefendant fails to object to perceived errors in indictment
before trial begins, this waives those objections on appeal).
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